Predicting Partisan Redistricting Disputes by Cain, Bruce E. & Campagna, Janet C.
DIVISION OF THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES 
CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 
PASADENA, CALIFORNIA 91125 
PREDICTING PARTISAN REDISTRICTING DISPUTES 
Bruce E. Cain 
California Institute of Technology 
Janet C. Campagna 
University of California, Irvine 
SOCIAL SCIENCE WORKING PAPER 639 
May 1987 
ABSTRACT 
Partisan redistricting disputes are relatively rare occurrences. This paper explores the 
factors that lead to partisan disputes over congressional redistricting plans. In previous work 
single party control of both houses of the state legislature and the governorship emerged as a 
key correlate of partisan redistricting in the 1980s. This paper presents an interactive 
statistical model of partisan redistricting plans. The basic conclusion is that in addition to 
single party control, the nature of the voting role and the political competitiveness of the 
states effect the likelihood of partisan redistricting. 
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The focus of redistricting studies has shifted measurably over the years. In the period 
immediately following.Baker v. Carr, the most commonly studied question was whether urban 
interests benefited and rural interests suffered from the application of the "one person, one 
vote" principle (Baker, 1967; Bicker, 1971; O'Rourke, 1980; Saffel, 1982). That issue persists 
(McCubbins and Schwartz, 1984), but scholarly attention was largely redirected in the 
seventies to the relationship between gerrymandering and the incumbency effect (Tufte, 1973; 
Bullock, 1975; Ferejohn, 1977). Now after the most recent round of redistrictings, the 
emphasis has moved to the partisan effects of line drawing, partly 7 as the result of much 
publicized partisan battles in such states as California, Indiana, New Jersey and Washington, 
and also because the courts have implied that this is an area they might rule on in the future. 
Most plans are passed with bipartisan blessing and thus, partisan disputes are relatively 
rare occurrences (Robertson, 1983). In previous work, one variable emerged as a key 
correlate of partisan redistricting--i.e., single party control of both houses of the state 
legislature and the Governorship (Erikson, 1972). However, single party control was not a 
sufficient predictor of partisan redistricting in the 1980s. In states such as Alabama, Florida, 
Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, North Carolina, Rhode Island and West Virginia, 
the legislature and the Governorship were controlled by the same party but no partisan battle 
ensued. The purpose of this study is to explore whether other factors might be involved. 
In the sections of the paper that follow, we will begin by outlining some theoretical 
considerations about why certain institutional and political factors should affect the outcome 
of Congressional redistrictings. We will then consider the components of partisan 
redistricting disputes. Finally, we will look at an interactive statistical model that attempts to 
predict why partisan redistricting plans occurred in some states but not others. The basic 
conclusion is that in addition to single party control, the nature of the voting rule and the 
political competitiveness of the state affect the likelihood of partisan redistricting. 
FACTORS LEADING TO PARTISAN OUTCOMES 
Why do partisan disputes over Congressional districting occur in some states, but not 
others? An explanation of this consists of two components: the political conditions that 
induce a majority party to try to gain extra seats from the minority party by means of 
redistricting and the institutional arrangements that make such an attempt successful. With 
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regard to the first, we can safely assume that a political party will prefer to increase the size 
of its delegation to a level that gives it control over the legislative bodies of a given state. 
The reasons for this are fairly straightforward. Control of the legislature facilitates the 
majority party's legislative agenda, and brings a greater share of the perks, staff and power 
to its incumbents. The more competitive the two parties are in a state, the more likely the 
redistricting process itself will be partisan: the gain or loss of an additional seat will matter 
more when the parties are nearly equal in strength than when there is a substantial imbalance 
between them. 
By the same logic, once a party has safe control of a legislature, then it is plausible to 
think that the incentive to add to its delegation by means of redistricting decreases. To put 
it another way, after a party has achieved a certain minimum winning coalitional size (with 
some risk averse allowance for slippage), the party should get diminished utility from .. adding 
more members to its caucus delegation. It might even be the case that at a certain point, the 
party actually becomes worse off by adding new members, because, for instance, there are 
not enough committee chairmanships to go around. 
Congressional lines, of course, are not drawn by Congressmen, and one might ask how 
partisan considerations spill into the drawing of Congressional districts? There may be self­
interested considerations: state legislators might want to increase the size of their party's 
Congressional delegation in order to have more potentially winnable (or at least open) seats 
for them to run in. It is also likely, of course, that legislators will have closer ideological and 
personal ties to the members of their own party's Congressional caucus than with those of the 
other party. Fina!Jy, the competitiveness of the state legislature can affect the general 
willingness of legislators from different parties to cooperate with one another. Residual 
bitterness over policy issues can affect the propensity for agreement on policy issues in the 
decade after redistricting. 
Another condition influencing the motivation of the majority party is the need to add or 
subtract 'congressional seats because of demographic shifts. The gain or loss of Congressional 
seats necessitates decisions that the parties can disagree about. On the other hand, if no 
changes in a state's Congressional delegation are dictated by the national apportionment 
formula, then the boundary adjustments required are likely to be less significant, and hence, 
less likely to cause partisan warfare. 
Whatever the intentions of the majority party, it cannot control the redistricting process 
unless certain political conditions and institutional arrangements obtain. One well 
acknowledged consideration is single party control of the redistricting process, defined as 
control by one party of both houses of the state legislature and the Governor's office. If 
control of the legislature is divided between the parties, it will be difficult for one party to 
impose its will on another. 
Another contributing factor is the voting rule employed by the legislature. The smaller 
the coalition size has to be in order to win, the easier it will be to put together such a 
coalition and the more frequently such a coalition will appear. If a legislature employs a 
majority rule, then the majority party need only hold most or all of its members in order to 
pass its redistricting plan through the legislature. If a two-thirds vote is required, then the 
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majority party will either have to possess two-thirds of the legislature's membership, or it 
will have to win over some minority party votes. 
In sum, the self-interested incentives of legislators lead naturally to bipartisan trades, but 
the legislative leadership of a majority party can steer redistricting in a partisan direction if 
certain political and institutional conditions obtain. In particular, we have suggested that 
partisan outcomes in legislative redistricting are more likely when: ( 1) the parties in the 
legislature are highly competitive; (2) one party controls the process; (3) the voting rule used 
in deciding a redistricting plan is a simple plurality or majority rule; and (4) when 
demographic changes dictate the addition or subtraction of a seat from the state delegation. 
In order to test this theory, we will first consider the nature of the dependent variable (i.e., 
whether there was a partisan dispute over the redistricting outcome), and then specify a 
statistical model that predicts the occurrence of partisan versus bipartisan Congressioqal 
redistricting outcomes as a function of the previously dicussed factors. 
COMPONENTS OF A PARTISAN PLAN 
Partisan fights over redistricting usually center on two issues: the distribution of 
incumbent displacement and the pattern of partisan reconstruction of the seats. With regard 
to the first, a partisan plan may be perceived by one of the parties as being uneven in its 
distribution of incumbent displacement--i.e., the amount of new territory an incumbent must 
�ake as the consequence of a redistricting plan. Assuming equal levels of partisan strength in 
two areas, incumbents will generally prefer the area with familiar constituents to the area 
with new and unfamiliar ones. The reason for this is quite simply that incumbents have 
typically invested a great deal of time and resources to establishing name recognition and a 
favorable image. Losing familiar constituents and replacing them with unfamiliar 
constituents amounts to throwing away that investment. 
To what extent was displacement an issue in partisan redistricting battles? Table 1 lists 
the states that had partisan disputes over Congressional redistricting and the issues at stake in 
each instance. From this, certain observations are possible. First, and most obviously, 
redistricting plans that put minority party legislators in the same district will tend to cause 
partisan disagreement. Such a situation either forces one of the incumbents to run in a 
different seat, or results in a costly primary fight, diverting money from critical November 
campaigns. As can be seen in Table l ,  the placement of minority incumbents in the same 
seat was an issue of contention in four states that had serious partisan redistricting battles-­
California, Illinois, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. 
[Insert Table 1 Here) 
A second observation is that minority parties will often protest redistricting changes that 
alter their incumbents' districts beyond some baseline expectation. The expectation that 
defines excessive change will often be based on the initial population surplus or deficit (i.e., 
the amount that the population of a district is greater or less than the ideal population). If 
district changes add or subtract more people than is required to get to the ideal population, 
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the displacement is more likely to be perceived as unfair. This was the case in Arizona when 
the Republicans reconfigured Udall's seat in 1981 in a manner that placed his voting 
residence in a new marginal seat composed of the Republican sections of Tucson and regions 
with so-called disloyal "Pinto" Democrats. The drastic rearrangements of the Dornan, 
Rousselot and Fiedler seats were a major source of contention in the California redistricting. 
Similarly, in Utah and Washington, Democratic incumbents were displaced to make room for 
new Republican leaning seats. In these cases, the issue was not that the incumbent had to 
run against another incumbent, but rather that the incumbent had to run in a different seat. 
Apart from displacement, a partisan redistricting dispute can also focus on the manner in 
which majority and minority party seats are made weaker or stronger by redistricting trades. 
In their ideal forms, partisan and bipartisan plans will display different characteristic 
patterns. In particular, a partisan redistricting plan should display an "efficient" pattern and 
a bipartisan pfan should display an "inefficient" pattern. In practice, many factors ranging 
from inertia to incumbent self-interest prevent most redistrictings from resembling either 
ideal type. Even the prototypical "Burton" plan in California contained numerous cases of 
partisan inefficiency (Cain, 1984). 
Even so, one might ask whether there is any evidence of movement towards greater 
efficiency among majority party incumbents in redistrictings controlled by one party. 
Measuring such changes is difficult. Ideally, one would like to use registration figures, but 
since these are not available in all states, it is necessary to find another measure of partisan 
strength that does not reflect idiosyncratic and local support for a particular candidate. An 
alternative measure that has been used with some success is the percent vote Carter received 
in the 1980 Presidential campaign. The pre-redistricting value is the actual 1980 Carter vote 
in a given Congressional district and the post-redistricting value is the reconstructed Carter 
vote--i.e., what Carter would have received in the new Congressional boundaries. While the 
Carter vote is free of particular Congressional candidate effects (e.g., factors such as 
incumbency, money, strength of the campaign run by the candidates, etc.) it does have some 
disadvantages as a measure of party strength. In particular, Carter scores understate the true 
level of potential Democratic strength in a given district, particularly in non-minority areas. 
On the other hand, the Carter vote tends to be highly correlated with registration, and hence, 
while imperfect, it is an acceptable alternative. 
The test of efficiency is the correlation between the level of partisan strength prior to 
redistricting and the nature of the change in partisan strength as a result of redistricting. 
Since an efficient plan would strengthen the weakest incumbents and weaken the strongest 
ones, there should be an inverse correlation between the previous level of partisan strength 
and the boost given by the redistricting. For states in which the Democrats controlled the 
redistricting, we should observe a negative correlation between the Carter scores in 1980 and 
increases in the Carter scores after redistricting for Democratic incumbents. In fact, we find 
that the correlation coefficient was -.38 and significant at p <.0 l level. The correlation of an 
efficient pattern of redistricting trades should be negative for Republicans also since those 
with the lowest Carter scores (i.e., the safest Republicans) should get the greatest gains in 
Democratic strength and those with the highest Carter scores (i.e., the most marginal 
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Republicans) should get the smallest increments. The correlation for Republicans when 
Democrats controlled the process was much smaller (i.e., -. 1 1) and not statistically significant. 
What is the pattern when Republicans controlled the redistricting process? In these 
instances, the efficiency correlation is statistically significant and properly signed for the 
Republican incumbents (-.58) and insignificant and positively signed (i.e., trades seemed to 
move in an inefficient direction) for Democratic incumbents (. 15). So there is some evidence 
that the patterns of trades do differ when one party as opposed to another controls the 
redistricting process. 
A MODEL OF PARTISAN OUTCOMES 
Having considered the components of a partisan dispute, we are now in a positiop. to test 
some of the ideas outlined earlier about the conditions that lead redistrictings to be partisan. 
The variable to be explained is whether both parties supported the redistricting plan (i.e., 
bipartisan outcome) of a given state or whether one of the parties opposed the plan (i.e., 
partisan outcome). This is coded one if partisan and zero if not (see Table 1 ). We restrict 
ourselves to legislative redistrictings of Congress only and thus omit the three judicial 
partisan plans. 
The independent variables in the model are of two kinds. The first are those that 
characterize the political and institutional arrangements most conducive to a partisan outcome. 
First, a redistricting is more likely to be partisan when one party controls both houses of the 
legislature and the governorship. This is, of course, a familiar proposition. However, we 
have argued that this is a necessary but not sufficient condition. There were many states in 
the south that satisfied this condition but still did not have a partisan outcome. A second 
variable from our earlier discussion is the competitiveness of the state legislature that draws 
the Congressional lines. If there is a competitive two party system, then the likelihood of 
partisan ·disagreement should increase. Conversely, when the parties are noncompetitive, 
disagreements should be less likely to fall along partisan lines. Thirdly, the voting rule used 
by the legislature will affect the probability of partisan agreement. A two-thirds rule will in 
most instances force the majority party in competitive states to moderate their plans or cause 
a stalemate. Our hypothesis is that when all three conditions obtain, the probability of a 
partisan outcome is highest. 
The second kind of factor that must be controlled in this model is the demographic 
constraints discussed earlier. We hypothesize that the likelihood of any changes that the 
parties might disagree over will be lower when a state does not have to add or lose any 
Congressional seats. Thus, we need to hold constant the apportionment status of each state 
with a dummy variable coded 1 when there were no changes in the number of seats 
apportioned to a given state. Because the dependent variable is binomial, the proper 
statistical procedure is logit. 
The specification of the model is as follows: 
Prob (Y) =(a+ b 1p + b2dJ
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where: 
Prob (Y) is the probability of a partisan outcome 
a is a constant term 
p is the three way interaction of single party control, majority rule, and the 
competitiveness term (I/percent of legislative seats held by the majority party in 
1980) 
d is apportionment status of each state (I if there were no changes in number of 
seats in state) 
We expect the coefficient on the interaction term to be positive, indicating that when these 
three conditions obtain, there is a high probability of a partisan plan. The sign of the 
coefficient on the demographic variable should be negative, indicating that a partisan dispute 
is less likely when there is no need for accommodating the gain or loss of a seat. 
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
Table 2 displays the results of the estimation. It also shows an alternative specification 
in which each of the institutional variables enters independently. As the results clearly show, 
the coefficient on the interactive term is significant and in the predicted direction. By 
comparison, the independently entered terms are not significant by conventional statistical 
standards. In both equations, the demographic variable is in the predicted direction. In 
short, it appears that a partisan Congressional redistricting outcome is most likely in a 
legislative setting when: 
1. one party controls both houses of the legislature and the governorship and;
2. the legislature employs a majority rule and;
3. the parties in a state legislature are competitive.
In addition, partisan disputes are most likely when apportionment causes changes in the size 
of the state's Congressional delegation. 
CONCLUSION 
Partisan redistricting outcomes, it was observed earlier, are relatively infrequent 
occurrences. The incentives facing legislators in a redistricting tend to pull them in a 
bipartisan direction. However, certain circumstances seem to be more conducive to partisan 
outcomes, including institutional arrangements that allow one party to control the process, 
political conditions that might lead one party to impose its plan over the other party's 
objections and demographic factors that cause much potentially volatile displacement. 
One implication of this is that there is an institutional remedy to the problem of partisan 
redistricting fights. If one seeks to diminish the likelihood of such squabbles, then one 
should look to institutional measures that make it harder for one party to impose its will on 
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another party. These could include requiring that the approval of the highest ranking elected 
official of the minority party, or two-thirds of the minority legislative party delegation, or, 
in many cases, simply two-thirds of the state legislature. It will not eliminate the possibility 
of a partisan outcome completely since it is still possible for a state legislature to fail to come 
to agreement and for the courts to draw politically controversial lines advertently or 
inadvertently. Still, such measures might reduce partisan fighting over redistricting to even 
fewer instances than there are presently. 
Arizona 
California 
Illinois 
Indiana 
Michigan 
Missouri 
New Jersey 
Oklahoma 
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Table 1 
CQ DESIGNATED PARTISAN PLANS (1982) 
Nature of Partisan Dispute 
Displacement of Udall seat to 
create new safe Rep. seat. 
Displacement of numerous Rep. 
incs., creation of 4 new Dem. 
seats, strengthening weak Dem. 
seats. Pairing of Goldwater­
Fiedler and Rousselot-Moorhead. 
2 Rep. incs. put in same seat. 
Displacement of Erlenborn, 
Porter seats. Strengthening 
of weak Simon seat. 
Displacement of Sharp, Evans 
and Fithian. 
Displacement of Rep. inc. Dunn. 
Preservation of urban Conyers 
and Crockett seats. 
Displacement of Bailey (R) and 
Emerson (R) seats. Preservation 
of underpopulated Clay (D) seat. 
Collapse of Fenwick (R) seat. 
Strengthened Howard (D) seat. 
2 Rep. incs. in same seat 
(Roukema and Courter). 
Preserves existing Dem. incs. 
Controlling Actor 
Rep. Leg. over-rides 
Dem. Gov. veto with 
2/3's vote. 
Dem. Legislature 
and Governor. 
Court 
Rep. Legislature 
and Governor. 
Court 
Court 
Dem. Legislature 
and Governor. 
Dem. Leg. & Gov. 
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Pennsylvania 2 pairs of Dem. incs. in same Rep. Legislature 
seats (Foglietta and Smith: and Governor. 
Bailey & Murtha). Weakened 
marginal Dem. seat (Walgren). 
Utah Creates new Rep.-leaning seat. Rep. Legislature 
Preserves marginal Marriott (R) seat. and Governor. 
Washington Creates new Rep.-leaning seat Rep. Legislature 
by displacing Dem. and Governor. 
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Table 2 
PREDICTING A PARTISAN PLAN 
No Seat Change -0.83 - 1.04 
(0.50) (0.45) 
Size Of Legislation Majority (SLM) 119.4 
(92.3) 
Majority Rule Legislation (MLR) 0.31 
(0.46) 
Single Party Control (SPC) 0.32 
(0.42) 
Interactive Term 61.0 
(29.l) 
Constant 2.59 4.55 
(1.67) (0.29) 
Chi Square 42 45 
Lo git 
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